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Abstract
  This presentation will discuss the need for national-level organizational strategies to effectively combat 
cyber security threats and cybercrime. In many countries, new agencies have been established and/or new 
roles have been allotted to existing agencies to cope with the needs for cyber security or fighting against 
cybercrime. The two pillars of organizational structure and functions (i.e., security vs. law enforcement) have 
given new challenges to us, especially in the context of traditional criminal justice system. To illustrate the 
challenges, a case study examining the responses to major security incidents followed by nationwide debates 
and remarkable organizational changes in Korea will be given. 
I.	  Introduction	  
  The world today has never been more connected in human history. Owing to the remarkable progress 
people made in information technology, which was marked by the advent of the Internet, it became possible 
to overcome the barriers of time and space in the cyberspace. Now it takes only a few seconds for people to 
communicate with each other from halfway around the world, and regional events can have global 
implications. In this context, Asia’s influence on world affairs in general is growing rapidly and will continue 
to grow in the next following decades. Asia boasts the largest population ‘offline’; it continues its dominance 
‘online’ as well, accounting for nearly 45% of all Internet users in the world3. Still this number is anticipated 
to grow further largely due to the increase of Internet users in China and India4.
  However, flip the coin; what you find is not a utopian ‘small world’, but a new space of  opportunities for 
the ‘bad guys,’ i.e., criminals. What we see is a flood of news reports and publications dealing with phishing, 
hacking incidents, DoS attacks and viruses targeting individuals, corporations and government sites, which 
are all united under the word most frequently used by the media, ‘cybercrime’. One of the most general 
assumptions on cybercrime is that as the number of Internet users increases, so will the number of 
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cybercrime cases. This is usually drawn from the theory that crime follows opportunity, which has become 
established wisdom in criminology. Grabosky and Smith (1998) explains this by referring to a notorious 
American bank robber who, when asked why he persisted in robbing banks, replied: “Because that’s where 
the money is.” Linking this flow of logic to the significance Asia possesses in terms of Internet users, one 
might grimly conclude that Asia will have to face a dark future in cyberspace, having the biggest number of 
cybercrime cases than anywhere in the world. 
  But is it so? For criminologists, this is not a simple problem. First of all, to confirm whether the number of 
cybercrime really increases as the number of Internet users grew, reliable empirical data about criminal 
trends should be provided. However, in order to accumulate such data, an agreement on a general definition 
of cybercrime and standard methods to measure cybercrime should be reached. Secondly, unlike ‘traditional’ 
crimes, cybercrime has many overlapping areas that tend to blur the existing boundaries between the public 
police and other governmental/private organizations. This is a reason why many organizations and functions 
other than the public police are involved in dealing with cybercrime issues. Due to this nature of cybercrime, 
information about cybercrime does not flow through a single channel and is distributed among many relevant 
agencies5. Solving these problems is essential both in analyzing cybercrime from the criminological point of 
view and also improving the national-level organizational strategies to effectively combat cyber security 
threats and cybercrime.
  This presentation aims to serve as a basis for solving this problem from a holistic view, focusing on the 
harmonization among relevant organizations and functions. In doing so, it will point out some practical 
problems and challenges that arise from the imbalance among different approaches to cybercrime by 
illustrating the case of South Korea. Finally, the presentation will conclude by giving some recommendations 
for national and international harmonization of organizational structure and its functions to improve global 
cooperation which is essential to protect the citizens from the borderless threats of cybercrime.
II.	  The	  Impact	  of	  Cybercrime	  on	  Criminology	  and	  Criminal	  Justice
i.	  Defining	  ‘Cybercrime’	  
  Defining the concept of ‘cybercrime’ is a critical matter; yet it is a difficult one which has huge impacts on 
not only legal issues such as the scope of jurisdiction but also on practical research designed to assess the 
impact of cybercrime on the society in general. Since policymaking relies heavily on the reliability of the 
information provided on the issue, the definition of cybercrime serves as a basis of quantitative measurement  
and qualitative classification. However, despite numerous attempts to define ‘cybercrime’ and classify it into 
categories, the following statement, which is part of the conclusion of a 1995 United Nations report that 
attempted to define ‘computer crime,’ still holds true for the concept of cybercrime as well:
 
“There is no doubt among the authors and experts who have attempted to arrive at definitions of computer 
crime that the phenomenon exists. However, the definitions that have been produced tend to relate to the 
2
5 Wall, D. S. (2007). Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age: Polity Press. p. 17. For more 
information on ‘policing’ the cyberspace and preventing cybercrime, see chapters 8 and 9 (pp. 157-206).
study for which they were written. [...] A global definition of computer crime has not been achieved; 
rather, functional definitions have been the norm.6”
  The Council of Europe’s Convention of Cybercrime, which is to date the only international convention 
related to the issue that is legally binding, uses ‘cybercrime’ as an umbrella term to refer to an array of 
criminal activity including the following: offenses against computer data and systems, computer-related 
offenses, content offenses, and copyright offenses7. 
  Nevertheless, functional definitions are not flexible enough to embrace new types of cybercrime; given the 
significance and difficulty of defining cybercrime, it would be more reasonable to extend the discussion to 
consider the overall ‘digitalization’ of crime itself, rather than to confine the issue to looking for a separate 
way to cope with a new type of crime. According to Wall (2007), the term ‘cybercrime’ itself  is fairly 
meaningless since it was largely an invention of the media and thus has been used metaphorically and 
emotionally rather than scientifically or legally. Rather, he argues that “the term [cybercrime] has a greater 
meaning if we construct it in terms of the transformation of criminal or harmful behavior by networked 
technology, rather than simply the behavior itself.8”
  Although the term ‘cybercrime’ is indiscriminately used in the media, regardless of its type, it does not take 
long to realize that cybercrime is not a specific, single type of new crime. It is rather a set of various forms of 
crime that are related to the cyberspace one way or another that awaits comprehensive explanations and 
measures. Therefore, in devising a better strategy to effectively combat cybercrime, first it would be 
meaningful to explore how networked technology changed criminal behavior and the landscape of criminal 
justice in policing the cyberspace.
ii.	  Criminological	  Explanations	  and	  the	  Need	  for	  Reliable	  Measurement
  There have been many attempts made in the field of criminology to explain the transformation network 
technology brought to criminal behavior. In the United States, trends in violent and property crime shows 
that throughout the 1970s and 1980s the crime rate changed in proportion to the fluctuation of the youth 
population; as the volume of the youth population grew, so did the crime rate. However, starting from the 
mid 1990s, even though the youth population grew, the crime rate continued to fall9. 
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  Ouimet (2008) identifies Internet usage as the main reason for this unexpected change in crime trends. 
Based on Cohen and Felson’s Routine Activities Theory, he argues that since Netscape and Internet Explorer 
became standard in operating systems in 1994 and 1995, the Internet has brought a transformation in the 
daily routines of people, increased the possibility of crime detection because of the almost permanent traces, 
and provided people with information that has crime protection potential, and therefore contributed to the 
significant decrease of crime during the 1990s10. 
  While this may hold true for the sudden change in non-cybercrime trends of the United States in the 1990s, 
many questions still remain unanswered or inadequately addressed. For example, does this mean that the 
arrival of networked technology cause a decline in the overall crime rate? In contrast to the decrease of 
violent crime in the 1990s, complaints on all kinds of cybercrime have been showing a sharp increase, and 
the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) now receives more complaints in a single month than it received 
in its first six months11. 
[Figure	  2]	  Internet	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Then, in this case, can it be that the decline of crimes in the real world was actually a natural corollary of the 
crime transition from the physical space to cyberspace? Or can it be that the Internet rather brings an increase 
in crime rate by providing new opportunities to meet strangers in the cyberspace and plot a crime in the real 
world? Ouimet’s explanation may account for the changes in crime trend of the United States during the 
1990s, but it cannot be generalized to explain the changes in other Internet-using countries which show very 
different results regarding the impact of Internet usage on crime rates. This illustrates the need for a more 
comprehensive and generalizable theory for explaining cybercrime.
  In fact, many attempts have been made to explain certain types of cybercrime with existing theories of 
criminology. But as cybercrime is a set of various types of crimes and does not clearly fit into the 
assumptions made by criminology, it is critical yet difficult to find a way to explain the phenomenon as a 
whole. In order to better understand the impacts of cybercrime Jaishankar (2008) has tried to provide an 
overall explanation for the phenomenon of cybercrime with his ‘Space Transition Theory12,’ which 
postulates the following:
1. Persons, with repressed criminal behavior ( in the physical space) have a propensity to commit crime 
in cyberspace, which, otherwise they would not commit in physical space, due to their status and 
position.
2. Identity, Flexibility, Dissociative Anonymity and lack of deterrence factor in the cyberspace provides 
the offenders the choice to commit cybercrime. 
3. Criminal behavior of offenders in cyberspace is likely to be imported to Physical space which, in 
physical space may be exported to cyberspace as well.
4. Intermittent ventures of offenders in to the cyberspace and the dynamic spatio-temporal nature of 
cyberspace provide the chance to escape. 
5. (a) Strangers are likely to unite together in cyberspace to commit crime in the physical space. (b) 
Associates of physical space are likely to unite to commit crime in cyberspace.
6. Persons from closed society are more likely to commit crimes in cyberspace than persons from open 
society.
7. The conflict of Norms and Values of Physical Space with the Norms and Values of cyberspace may 
lead to cybercrimes.
  Despite of the absence of a consistent and comprehensive definition of cybercrime, as criminology has 
started viewing the emergence of cyberspace as a new locus of criminal activity13,  Jaishankar’s attempt to 
take an overall look at cybercrime is meaningful. However, although his theory seems to be persuasive, there 
is a need to test whether the above statements actually explains cyber-criminal activities. Perhaps the most 
general way to do this, as in verifying hypotheses in other fields as well, is by using quantitative data such as 
statistics. 
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iii.	  Changing	  Landscape	  of	  Criminal	  Justice	  in	  Policing	  the	  Cyberspace	  
  The most generally used statistics in analyzing criminal behavior usually is that from public police 
departments, since the information of most traditional crimes would be reported to the police as that is where 
the case is to be resolved. This was possible because the criminal, victim, and the place where the case 
occurred were usually located in the same place or restricted to a certain area, and thus crime tended to be 
locally or nationally defined. Wall (2007) explains how cybercrimes made a change to this landscape. First, 
cybercrime contributed to “radical changes in the organization of crime and the division of criminal labor, 
and to changes in the scope of criminal opportunity14.” This had a huge impact upon the existing localized 
criminal justice landscape by introducing a “new global dimension to the relationship between police, 
technology and the public15”. Unlike traditional types of crime, networked technology makes it possible for 
cybercrime to overcome geographical constraints, making its reach global and inter-jurisdictional. According 
to Wall, in spite of various procedural and organizational responses, cybercrime poses a number of 
challenges to the traditional policing paradigm: de minimism (‘the law does not deal with trifles’), which 
causes cybercrime to fall outside the traditional Peelian paradigm of policing dangerousness; nullum crimen 
(no crime without law) disparities in inter-jurisdictional cases; jurisdictional disparities; difficulties can arise 
when non-routine activities such as cross-border investigations happen, since the public police tends to be 
based upon local and ‘routinized’ practices; and under-reporting16. Consequently, cybercrime clearly falls 
outside the traditional purview of public police and causes under-reporting of cybercrime victimization to the 
police:
“Put simply, relatively few Internet-related crimes are reported to the police because most are resolved 
elsewhere by the victims themselves, or by the panoply of other types of organizations or groups involved 
in the regulation of behavior in cyberspace.17”
 Due to these reasons, Wall argues that the role of the public police in policing cybercrime should be 
understood as a small part of the networks of security within the cyberspace, and that the public police needs 
to forge new relationships with the other nodes within the network18. This argument is especially noteworthy, 
not only because of the distributed nature of cybercrime, but also because in reality there are many interest 
groups who play a role in policing cybercrimes other than the public police, either private organizations or 
governmental non-police organizations. As this is a relatively recent issue, public police in many countries 
are undergoing a transition period and are exploring how to forge partnerships with other organizations or 
agencies.
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  What this change in the landscape of criminal justice implies is that unlike the information of traditional 
crimes that usually flows through a single channel, the information of cybercrime is distributed among many 
private and public entities, so without adequate networking and collaboration among these organizations it is 
difficult to establish a comprehensive national, or even international, strategy to combat cybercrime. As Wall 
himself mentions, “We need reliable information about criminal trends not only to make sense of ‘the 
problem’, but also to act as a key driver of (criminal justice) policy reform and resource allocation within 
relevant agencies19. (...) The key issue here is about whether reliable information flows freely to form 
reliable viewpoints20.” This account makes it clear that cooperation among various organizations with 
different functions is critical to grasp the situation of cybercrime and establish effective strategies to deal 
with it by enabling the provision of reliable information. From a long-term perspective, this is certain to have 
a bigger impact on the development of cyber criminology or criminology in general, both in verifying new 
theories that purport to explain cybercrime and in assisting the academic field to understand cybercrime 
more comprehensively. 
  But before arguing that multi-agency cross-sector partnerships are necessary for the development of 
criminology and more effective policies to combat cybercrime, taking a look at how the organizations 
involved in this issue are structured in reality would help to find more specific and feasible solution, since 
there exists a huge difference among states in the way the relevant entities are organized.
III.	  Approaches	  on	  Cyber	  Attacks:	  Security	  vs.	  Law	  Enforcement
i.	  The	  Two	  Approaches	  on	  Cyber	  Attacks
  To date, many states have placed ‘combating cybercrime’ on the national agenda, and cybercrime has 
become an important issue at the global level as well. Yet not many countries have come up with an effective 
way to harmonize the functions of existing organizations and government agencies to better cope with the 
issue. Apart from the lack of a standard definition of cybercrime and the difficulty in measuring it, the 
absence of a holistic approach in viewing the issue of cybercrime stands as the main obstacle in establishing 
a comprehensive national strategy for cybercrime.
  Currently there are two main approaches which is common at both the national and international level when 
viewing cyber attacks: a security-oriented approach, which first originated from viewing the threats from 
cyberspace as a technical threat to national security; and a law enforcement approach, which approaches the 
issue from a criminal justice point of view. The former has a tendency to focus on deterrence and prevention, 
while the latter emphasizes on investigation and attribution. This point is well identified in Maurer (2011)’s 
work. Maurer distinguished two streams of discourse in the United Nations on cyber security issues: the 
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politico-military stream, which mainly has to do with cyber arms race; and the economic stream focusing on 
the criminal use of information technologies21.
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  While this Two Streams Model illustrates how international norms of cyber security is currently emerging 
in the United Nations and related organizations, it is nevertheless a result of close observation of the 
activities related to cyber norms emergence and thus has no normative implications for how the issue should 
be dealt with in reality. Just as cybercrime changed the landscape of criminal justice as mentioned above, the 
bigger picture of cyber attacks in general has also blurred the traditional boundaries that existed between 
crime and warfare.
  Traditionally, regulation and deterrence of crime belongs to the purview of criminal justice and the 
perpetrator is punished by the law enforcement, which is mostly based on domestic law. On the other hand, 
warfare is conflict between states and follows the rules of international law. When physical attack was the 
only possible form of aggression, this dual approach and response was quite reasonable. But since stories of 
cyber attacks started to make the front page in all newspapers, it is becoming all the more difficult to 
conceptually distinguish between warfare and crime and decide how to resolve a certain case. 
ii.	  The	  Problem	  of	  Demarcation	  and	  Attribution	  of	  Cyber	  Attacks
  Nye (2010) has classified four major cyber threats to national security as economic espionage, crime, cyber 
war, and cyber terrorism22. These concepts are widely used, despite the fact that there is no universal 
definition for these concepts, making demarcation among them difficult. Nevertheless, basically all four 
concepts have one thing in common: they are all subject to the regulation of law. Cyber war should be ruled 
by international law, while cyber terrorism, cybercrime and economic espionage can be categorized as crime 
and is subject to criminal law. Since there is no fully developed international practice or norm regarding 
cyber war to date and both economic espionage and cyber terrorism can be classified as a type of 
cybercrime, there is no point in distinguishing between the type of legislation applied to each of the four 
attacks. Rather, demarcation has a bigger meaning in practical terms such as deciding the division of labor 
among relevant organizations and agencies in response to such incidents. 
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  Yet, even if one day we reach a point where the demarcation problem of cyber attacks based on standard 
definitions is resolved, due to the nature of the cyberspace it is difficult to attribute a certain attack to one of 
the four types of cyber attack. Technically this is because it is difficult to trace the attacker, and easier for the 
attacker to disguise or detour, Other than technical reasons there are legal problems in tracing information 
located overseas and difficulties in acquiring voluntary cooperation from foreign counterparts. Since a 
precise method for attribution has yet to be developed, the attribution process should be based upon several 
elements, such as the type of attack, subject, period of time, the size and impact of the attack, target of attack, 
and motive, put together. However, it is very difficult to collect all these information perfectly due to the 
distributed nature of cyber attacks and the lack of partnership among relevant organizations at the current 
stage. 
  Regarding criminal investigation, the discussion on the role in attribution is especially important. This point 
was already made by the United States in 2003 in The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace:
 
“Law enforcement and the national security community play a critical role in preventing attacks in 
cyberspace. Law enforcement plays the central role in attributing an attack through the exercise of 
criminal justice authorities. Many cyber-based attacks are crimes. As a result the Justice Department’s 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, the FBI’s Cyber Division, and the U.S. Secret Service 
all play a central role in apprehending and swiftly bringing to justice the responsible individuals. (...) 
Ideally, an investigation, arrest, and prosecution of the perpetrators, or a diplomatic response in the case 
of a state-sponsored action, will follow such an incident23.”
  It is a natural corollary for the law enforcement to play the central role in attribution since legal authority 
prescribed by the criminal justice procedure is necessary in identifying the origin and thus attributing a cyber 
attack case to a certain type of attack, and because it is generally allowed to take a criminal justice approach 
regardless of the type of attack. Under normal situations, a case should be first attributed to a certain type 
through investigation led by law enforcement agencies in order to decide how to respond to it depending on 
its type of attack. 
  However, the overall structure of cyber attacks response differs from one state to another, and some 
countries have cyber crisis management systems that put defense and damage restoration above cyber attack 
attribution. By doing so, it becomes extremely difficult not only in the attribution of a certain cyber attack, 
but also in generating information about the “changing nature of threats, the characteristics and 
methodologies of threats, and emerging threat idiosyncrasies for the purpose of developing response 
strategies and reallocating resources, as necessary, to accomplish effective prevention24,” which is critical for 
both the academic circle of criminology and decision-makers who establish national strategies for the 
cyberspace. A good example is the case of South Korea.
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III.	  Case	  Study:	  South	  Korea’s	  National	  Cybersecurity	  Structure
i. Current National Cyber Security Structure of South Korea
  The ‘information security policy’ was first implemented in the mid 1990s as a part of ‘informatization’ 
strategy. In 1996, the Korean Information Security Center (currently Korea Internet & Security Agency) was 
established, based on the Act on Expansion and Dissemination and Promotion of Utilization of Information 
System (currently the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and 
Information Protection, etc., which works as a mother law for regulating most of the misconducts on 
cyberspace). In 2000, triggered by the Mafia boy’s DDoS attacks and global media attention, the Cyber 
Terror Response Center (CTRC) of Korea National Police Agency was established. Since then, major 
security incidents have provoked changes in the national cyber security strategy and organizational 
structures. For example, in the aftermath of the 2003. 1. 25. Slammer Worm incident, also known as 1·25 
Internet Disaster in South Korea, several new organizations were launched following national concerns. The 
National Cyber Security Center in the National Intelligence Service (NIS) became responsible for national 
cyber security in the public sector, while the Ministry of National Defense (MND) set up the Information 
Warfare Response Center to handle cyber warfare, and the Korea Internet Security Center (KISA) launched 
the Korean Internet Incident Response Center which became responsible for national cyber security in the 
private sector. This set of alphabet soup triggered the initial national cyber security framework. After the 
2004 National Espionage case, in which the investigation started from a civillian’s report about a spoofed 
email and some sort of attribution was successful, the government announced the Presidential Directive for 
National Cyber Security Regulation and the Presidential Directive for National Crisis Management, both of 
which are controlled by the National Security Council (NSC) secretariat. Following the 2009 7·7 DDoS 
attack, which was traced back to the origin of North Korea by the CTRC, in August the Comprehensive 
Countermeasure for Cyber Crisis was released. This initiative in effect eliminated the roles of the NSC and 
reinforced the responsibilities of the NIS. In 2010, the Cyber Command was established in the MND.
  Centering on security incident response, currently there are three national frameworks: Critical Information 
Infrastructure (CII) protection framework, which is based on the Act on the Protection of Information and 
Communications Infrastructure of 2001 and is chaired by the Minister of Prime Minister Office (PMO); 
National Cybersecurity Regulation (NCR), which is based on the Presidential Directive for National Cyber 
Security Regulation and is chaired by the head of NIS, is applied to all governmental information systems 
except for CII; and Security Incident Response in Private Sectors, based on the Act on Promotion of 
Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection. 
ii.	  Problems	  of	  the	  Current	  Structure
(i)	  National	  Cybersecurity	  Regulation	  (NCR)
  Among these three frameworks, the NCR represents the overwhelming control of the National Intelligence 
Service over the governmental information system.
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[Picture	  2]	  National	  Cybersecurity	  Regulation
  Normally governmental CERTs are in charge of the monitoring, and relevant information is transferred to 
the NIS through networks. When an incident is detected, it is required to report to the NIS. The inspections 
are carried out by governmental agencies if it seems to be a ‘trivial’ case, but by the NIS if is a ‘serious’ one. 
When national security is concerned, it is mandatory for law enforcement agencies to inform the NIS of the 
criminal case, whereas it is optional for the NIS to notify law enforcement agencies of the case if there is any 
criminal suspicion since. As most cyber incidents are crimes under the existing law, this optional clause 
could be in violation of the Criminal Procedure Act, which states that “when a public official in the course of 
his/her duty believes that an offense has been committed, he shall lodge an accusation” (Art. 234 (2)). 
Moreover, this regulation also seriously undermines the basis for cybercrime measurement. Since 2009, the 
NIS stopped announcing the statistics of incidents against governmental information systems. As most cases 
handled by the NIS does not undergo police investigation, the nondisclosure of statistics severely flaws the 
current cybercrime statistics announced by the police.
  In addition, recently the government has announced the National Cyber Security Master Plan in August 
2011, which designated the Director of the NIS to oversee and coordinate national cybersecurity-related 
policy and management. This can be very dangerous, since national intelligence services act relatively free 
from legal restrictions due to the nature of its mission. When NIS operations are confined to providing 
national security intelligence to “support decision” making, the low legal threshold applied to the NIS 
usually does not matter. However, giving the NIS the authority to “coordinate” policy without any legal 
restrictions threatens the balance of power, which is one of the principles of democracy.
(ii)	  Security	  Incident	  Response	  in	  Private	  Sectors
  The framework for Security Incident Response in Private Sectors also shows a simliar problem of over-
centralization and lack of harmonization among relevant organizations. Article 48-3 of The Act on Promotion 
of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, on which this 
framework is based, stipulates obligation to immediately report incidents against 1) a provider of information 
Governmental CERTs 
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and communications services or; 2) A business operator of clustered information and communications 
facilities. Furthermore, in Article 48-4 (5):
“The Korea Communications Commission or the joint private-public investigation team shall not use the 
information learned through the data submitted and the investigation conducted in accordance with 
paragraph (4) for any purposes other than analysis of causes of the intrusion and preparation of 
countermeasures, and shall destroy it immediately after the analysis of causes is completed.”
  Although the role of law enforcement is indispensable due to the legal authority required in the criminal 
procedure in attribution since it is necessary to identify the origin of the attack, nowhere does the Act clearly 
mention the need to collaborate with law enforcement agencies. Moreover, Article 48-4 (5) further impedes 
attempts to measure cybercrime. To borrow the words of Wall, this not only preclude relevant agencies from 
acquiring reliable information about criminal trends, but also severely undermines the resources 
policymakers can refer to when making decisions for a better national cyber security policy and resource 
allocation within relevant agencies.
(iii)	  Failure	  to	  Recognize	  the	  Role	  of	  Law	  Enforcement	  and	  Cybercrime	  Measurement	  
  While the National Cybersecurity Regulation grants excessive access and control to information of cyber 
incidence to the intelligence service, the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network 
Utilization and Information Protection restricts the use of information other than the analysis of cause of the 
intrusion and preparation of countermeasures, and requires the immediate destruction of information after 
such analysis is completed, thereby making the measurement of cybercrime difficult and also impedes 
criminal investigation on cyber incidents. 
  Both frameworks have little in mind of the nature of cyber attacks, i.e., the fact that most types of cyber 
attacks can and should be dealt according to the criminal law, and lacks an overall view of the problem, 
thereby granting excessive authority to either the intelligence service or the security community while failing 
to recognize the need to work with the law enforcement. This is a stark contrast compared to the incident 
response system of the United States, which is frequently referred to as a model cyber security framework. 
According to the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), federal agencies must report 
incidents to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) and the details are guided 
by the Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, which mentions the role of law enforcement as follows: 
“One reason that many security-related incidents do not result in convictions is that organizations do not 
properly contact law enforcement. (...) The incident response team should become acquainted with its 
various law enforcement representatives before an incident occurs to discuss conditions under which 
incidents should be reported to them, how the reporting should be performed, what evidence should be 
collected, and how it should be collected. Law enforcement should be contacted through designated 
individuals in a manner consistent with the requirements of the law and the organization’s procedures. 
Many organizations prefer to appoint one incident response team member as the primary POC with law 
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enforcement. This person should be familiar with the reporting procedures for all relevant law 
enforcement agencies and well prepared to recommend which agency, if any, should be contacted25.”
  Not to mention that this failure to recognize the importance of law enforcement in incident management, it 
also seriously undermines the grounds for reliable measurement of cybercrime, either by giving the 
intelligence excessive authority in handling relevant information while paying insufficient attention to the 
role law enforcement plays in attribution, or by restricting the use of information of private sector security 
incidents to the analysis of causes of the intrusion and preparation of countermeasures, thereby blocking the 
information flow to law enforcement agencies for criminal investigation. 
iv.	  Need	  for	  Harmonization	  among	  Organizations
  Taking a look at the big picture of national security, the problems mentioned above seem to originate from 
the lack of consistency in the national cyber security strategy and organizational structures. As mentioned 
earlier, the current national cyber security structure was subject to changes every time a major security 
incident occurred. The words of Schnier (2000) are especially meaningful in pointing this out: 
“The policy [an overall strategy] is what ties everything together. (...) [a security policy should be built] 
based on the threat analysis, (...) The policy should outline who is responsible for what (implementation, 
enforcement, audit, review), what the basic network security policies are, and why they are the way they 
are. The last one is important; arbitrary policies brought down from on high with no explanation are likely 
to be ignored. A clear, concise, coherent, and consistent policy is more likely to be followed. (...) In any 
case, the security policy needs to outline “why” and not “how”26.”
  But the lack of consistency is not the root of the problem. Why new agencies were established every time 
an incident occurred is because South Korea does not have an overall national strategy based on inadequate 
threat analysis. This is why the current national cyber security structure of South Korea only explains “how” 
to deal with cyber incidents and which agency carries out what responsibilities, but does not tell “why” it has 
granted the NIS de facto control over incidents of governmental information networks, or “why” the 
information of private sector security incidents should be immediately destroyed after the analysis of cause is 
completed. Although the issue of cyber incident response may appear to be a complex issue, if anyone paid 
sufficient attention to the nature of cyber attacks and recognized the difficulty of attribution and 
measurement, law enforcement may have been playing an important role in detecting, attributing, and 
identifying the perpetrator. 
13
25 Scanfone, K., Grance, T., & Masone, K. (2008). Computer Security Incident Handling Guide NIST Special 
Publication: National Institute of Standards and Technology. p. 2-6.
26 Schneier, B. (2000). Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World. Indianapolis, Indiana: Wiley Publishing, 
  Nevertheless, “security is a process, not a product27.” Although the current national cybersecurity structure 
of South Korea has many problems, they can be resolved by promoting harmonization among relevant 
organizations. 
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27 Ibid., p. 84. 
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